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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
MERRILL HOLBROOK,
)
Defendant and Appellant} .
vs.
LOUISE HOLBROOK,
Plaintiff and Respondent.

Case No. 7296

)

APPELLANT'S BRIEF
STATEMENT OF CASE
On the 3rd day of May, 1948 the Second Judicial District
Court, in and for Davis County, State of Utah, the Honorable
Charles G. Cowley presiding, granted a divorce to the respondent herein against the appellant, and, among other things,
ordered the appellant to pay to the respondent the sum of
$150.00 per month for the support and maintenance of four
minor children, the issue of the marriage between the two,
the custody of which children was, by the decree, awarded
to the respondent.
On the 11th day of January, 1949 the appellant herein
was cited before the court for failure to pay the full amount
of said support money. At said hearing on January 11, 1949
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Judge A. H. Ellett, temporarily sitting in the Second Judical
District presided. The evidence indicated that from the time
of the entry of the decree in May of 1948 until the 11th day
of January, 1949 the appellant herein had paid to the respondent the sum of approximately $630.00. The court ordered the
appellant committed to the county jail for a period of thirty
days for contempt unless the appellant paid to the respondent
the support money found in arrears in the sum of $645.00.
At the time of the hearing on January 11, 1949 a petition
was filed by the appellant herein for the reduction of the
support money for the children from $150.00 per month to
$80.00 per month on the ground that changed financial conditions on the part of the respondent occurring between the
date of the entry of the decree in May of 1948 and the date
of the filing of the petition made such reduction equitable.
The court declined to hear evidence on this point on the ground
that changed conditions in financial circumstances in the mother
was not such a changed condition that would under any circumstances warrant a change in the amount of support money
payable.
This appeal is taken from the order of the court holding
the appellant herein in contempt of court and also from the
refusal of the court to consider the appellant's petition for
a modification of the decree. The facts as brought out at the
hearing will be more fully discussed in relation to the points
to which they are applicable.
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ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
The appellant assigns the following errors as a basis for
asking this court for a reversal of the holding of the lower
court:
1. The court erred in its finding that the appellant herein

had received $435.00 per month during the period between
the entry of the divorce decree and the hearing on the contempt
procedings.
2. The court erred in holding the appellant herein in
contempt for failure t::> pay the sum of $645.00 in the absence
of a finding on the part of the court that the appellant was able
to pay such amount.

3. The court erred in holding that changed financial
cimcumstances on the part of a mother are not such changed
circumstances as may justify the modification of an order
for the payment of suport money for minor children.

ARGUMENT
THE COURT ERRED IN ITS FINDING AS TO THE
APPELLANT'S EARNINGS.
On page 51 of the record the court stated: "It appears
you received four hundred thirty-five dollars a month less the
expense on the house * * * " This statement is in direct
variance with the evidence presented at the hearing. It was
stipulated between the parties that the appellant herein earned
the sum of $300.00 per month. (Tr. 14). The court evidently based its statement that the defendant received $435.00
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per month on the fact that the evidence shows that the home,
which had formerly belonged to the parties hereto, was being
rented for the sum of $135.00 per month. This statement,
however, overlooks entirely the fact which appears in the
evidence (Tr. 43) that both of the parties hereto conveyed
this home to the appellant's mother and that she in turn
borrowed $7500.00 on this home and turned it over to the
appellant in order that he might pay to the respondent the
cash settlement ordered at the time the divorce decree was
entered in May, 1948. The evidence shows that this home
still belongs to the appellant's mother and that while the
rent payments were made on said home at the appellant's
place of business he received none of it. The appellant
specifically testified that he had received no money whatsoever
from the rental of this house. The respondent introduced
no evidence whatever to contradict this statement. The finding
of the court, therefore, that the appellant received the sum
of $435.00 is not only not supported by the evidence but is
in direct contradiction to the evidence in the record on this
point.
THE COURT ERRED IN ORDERING THE APPELLANT
COMMITTED FOR CONTEMPT IN THE ABSENCE
OF A FINDING AS TO HIS ABILITY TO PAY.
There were no formal findings at all entered following
the hearing of January 11, 1949. There is in the record on
page 123 a minute entry signed by the court wherein the court
states: "That the defendant was able to have paid the sums
assessed against him according to the decree and that he wilfully
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neglected and failed to pay the sum of $645.00 of the sum
of assessed." Whether or not this minute entry can be considered as a formal finding counsel has strong doubts. It has been
held by this court in a number of cases that an order of contempt cannot be sustained in the absence of findings.
Assuming, however, that the findings as entered are
proper as to form they are not sufficient to support the contempt order of the court. There is no finding, and if there
were such a finding there is no evidence to support it, that the
defendant at the time of the hearing on January 11, 1949 had
the ability to pay the $645.00 that he was ordered to pay.
The defendant specifically denied that he had the ability to
pay this amount at the time and no proof was entered by
respondent that he was able to do so.
Contempt generally falls into two classes, punitive and
purposive contempt. Punitive contempt is designed to punish
a person for some act or omission which constitutes contempt
of the court's order. Purposive contempt on the other hand
is designed to compel the individual to comply with an order
of the court. This is clearly a purposive contempt. The court
ordered the appellant committed to jail unless he made payment of the sum of $645.00. If the contempt had been punitive
he would have been ordered to jail regardless of his payment
or if payment had been ordered it would have been a payment
in the nature of a fine made to the state and not a payment to
the other party in the case. Where a contemp~ is purposive
it is clear that the person ordered to comply with the directive
of th~ court must be presently able to comply. This matter
is discussed at length by the Supreme Court of the State of
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Washington in the case of Snook v. Snook, 188 Pac. 502.
There the court stated:
"This is not a criminal contempt proceeding. It is a
civil contempt proceding, the object of which is not
to punish the appellant, but to coerce him to pay the
money in satisfaction of the alimony portion of the
decree of divorce. 6 R. C. L. 490. It may be that
appellant's past failure to make the payments is of such
inexcusable character that he could be punished by
fine or imprisonment in a criminal contempt proceeding,
regardless of his present inability to make payment
thereof; but, if so, such punishment would have to be
in the nature of a fine of a fixed amount payable to the
state, or to be satisfied by imprisonment at the rate
of a fixed sum for each day of imprisonment, or such
punishment would have to be imprisonment for a
fixed term. Such is not the nature of the judgment
sought or rendered in this proceeding. In a contempt
proceeding of this character, the object of which is to
coerce the payment of money, the lack of ability to
pay on the part of the defendant is always a complete
defense against enforcing payment from the defendant
by imprisonment. In harmony with the law on that
subject in most of the jurisdictions of this country,
this court has repeatedly so held. Holcomb vs. Holcomb, 53 Wash. 611, 102 Pac. 653; Bayle v. Boyle,
74 Wash. 529, 133 Pac. 1009; Crombie v. Crombie,
88 Wash. 520, 153 Pac. 306; Smiley v. Smiley, 99
Wash. 577, 169 Pac. 962; Wells v. Wells, 99 Wash.
492, L.R.A. 1918C, 291, 169 Pac. 970.
We conclude that appellant's inability to pay the
money as directed by the judgment from which he
has appealed sufficiently appears to call for a reversal
of the judgment. It is so ordered."
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The Utah case of Watson z·. lVdtson, 72 Ut. 218; 269
Pac. 775 appears to be directly in point, the only distinction
between the two cases being that in \'\'atson v. Watson the
defendant was ordered committed until he made payment of
a certain amount where in this case the defendant is ordered
committed for a definite term unless he makes such payment.
The finding of the court in Watson v. \'7atson as iri this case,
if we are to consider the minute entry as a finding, ',vas to
the effect that the defendant had earned sufficient money to
pay the installments at the time they were due. Neither in
the Watson case or in this case, however, was there any findin~
of a present ability on the part of the defendant to make
payment. The language of the court in the Watson case was
as follows:
"The order comm1ttmg the defendant to imprisonment until he pays $600 delinquent alimony is assailed
upon the ground that there is no sufficient proof or
finding that the defendant had the ability to make
the payment in default of which he was to be imprisoned. The finding of the court on this subject
was that since the entry of the decree awarding alimony
'defendant has earned sufficient wages to pay said
alimony, but that defendant has willfully refused to
pay said alimony, and this court finds that said defendant is in contempt of court for willfully refusing
to pay said alimony.' There was satisfactory and
sufficient evidence to support the above finding.
( 1) The particular question here, however, arises
upon the contention of defendant that the finding made
by the court does not warrant or support the judgment
of imprisonment which was entered against him. It
is argued that a finding of present ability to comply
with an order is an essential prerequisite to an order
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that the delinquent be imprisoned until he does comply.
In support thereof the following cases are cited: Ex
parte Silvia, 123 Cal. 293, 55 P. 988, 69 Am. St. Rep.
58; In re Cowden, 139 Cal. 244, 83 P. 156; Lutz v.
District Court, 29 Nev. 152, 86 P. 445; Ex parte Hamberg, 37 Idaho, 550, 217 P. 264-to which may be
added our own decision in Hillyard v. District Court
(Utah) 249 P. 806.
The judgments considered in the cited cases were
all coercive in form and purpose and intended to
compel the payment of money by the delinquent, by
an order of indefinite imprisonment until the payment
was made. To support such a judgment in contempt
it is clear that it should first appear that the act sought
to be coerced was yet within the power of the per:;on
proceeded against to perform. It would be repugnant
to reason and futile to order a person imprisoned
until he did some particular thing, unless he had the
present ability to do it."
The court evidently hoped to avoid the effect of the Watson
case by making the term of imprisonment for a definite term
to be suspended upon the payment of $645.00 to the clerk of
the court without stating that it was for the benefit of the
respondent herein. However, the evidence clearly indicates
and the court stated in its minute entry that the $645.00 was the
amount unpaid on the alimony and therefore regardless of what
the language of the court may have been it is obvious the effect
of the order was that the appellant herein must pay the amount
in arrears in alimony or be committed to jail. It is very clearly
a purposive contempt and directly within the provisions of
Watson v. Watson.
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THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT CH1\NGED
FINANCIAL CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE \'VIPE IS
NOT SUCH A CHANGE IN CONDITIONS AS TO
BE CONSIDERED IN A PETITION FOR ~fODIFI
CATION OF THE DECREE.
Prior to the hearing on January 11, 1949 the appellant
herein filed a cross-petition praying that the support money
payments be reduced from $150.00 per month to $80.00 per
month. The change in circumstances as alleged in this petition were that since the entry of the divorce decree the
respondent herein had secured employment and was earning
approximately $175.00 per month. When the appellant
attempted to introduce evidence regarding the change in
financial circumstances of the wife the court refused to hear
it stating in effect that no change in the financial circumstances
of the wife resulting from her employment should be considered in a petition for reduction of support but that the
only change in circumstances that could be considered was
the change in the income of the husband (Tr. 52). Had
the court considered the evidence as to the wife's earnings and
then found that such change in circumstances was not sufficient
to justify a modification of the decree, it may be that such
a finding would have been within the discretion of the court.
However, the court in this case found that a change in the
financial circumstances of the wife resulting from her employment is not a matter that should be considered at all
and the court refused to let counsel for the appellant pursue
the matter (Tr. 23).
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There is evidence in the record, however, which indicates that the respondent herein was not employed and had
no income at the time of the divorce decree. The evidence
further indicates that at the time of the hearing she \vas
and had for some months been employed at a salary of approximately $170.00 to $175.00 per month. Therefore, if
the husband were to pay $150.00 per month out of his salary
for the support of the wife and children, the wife, to maintain
her household, would have a total income of approximately
$320.00 as aginst $150.00 for the husband. When this is
considered in connection with the fact that the husband
turned over to the wife enough money to buy a home, which
he had to borrow, and the further fact that the husband was
obligated to pay in addition to this amount approximately
$5000.00 (T. 41) in debts contractly jointly by himself and his
wife prior to the time of the divorce it was certainly a situation
that should have been considered by the court.
Counsel is aware that the question of whether the employment of a wife folowing the entry of a divorce decree is
such a change of circumstances as will warrant a modification
of a decree an open question in this state. It is clear, as the
court stated into the record (Tr. 23) that the re-marriage of
the wife and the financial condition of the second husband
have no bearing upon the amount the father must pay to
support the children. However, a different circumstance
exists where the wife has means of her own. In the case
of Rockwood v. Rockwood, 236 Pac. 457, the court said in
regard to the proof of the father: "He has not shown that
the mother of the children is able to support them and even
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if he had it is not clear that such fact would alter the case."
As stated above the question as to whether or not the mother's
ability acquired subsequently to the entry of the decree to
support the children is such a change in circumstances as to
warrant a modification is still an open question in this state.
It appears to counsel, however, that a reading of our statute
forces one to the conclusion that both the financial ability
of the mother and the father should be taken into consideration
in determining amounts payable by the father for the support
of the children. Section 40-3-5, Utah Code Annotated, 1943,
provides in part:

" * * * Such subsequent changes or new orders
may be made by the court with respect to the disposal
of the children or the distribution of property as
shall be reasonable and proper."
In the case of Morris v. Morris, (Neb.) 290 N. W. 720
the court stated:
"The subsequent employment of plaintiff is a circumstance that may justify a modification of the decree
as a matter of judicial discretion, if there are appealing
equities in defendant's situation."
In the case of Wassung v. Wasszmg (Neb.) 286 N. W.
340 the court stated:
"The reduction in defendant's wages and the employment of the plaintiff are changes in the circumstances of the parties that justify a prospective modification of this decree under the power granted to the
court in Section 42-312 Comp. St. 1929, and section
42-324, Comp. St. Supp. 1937."
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In each of the followitfg cases from varying jurisdictiom
the employment of the wife subsequent to the entry of the
divorce decree was considered as the sole factor or as a major
factor in conjunction with other circumstances to justify a
modification of the decree ordering payment of support money
for minor children: Lines v. Lines, (S.D.)9 N. W. (2d) 705;
Sullivan v. Sullivan (Neb.), 4 N. JJV. (2d) 919; Caprio v.
Caprio (N. Y.) 8 N. Y. S. (2d) 205; Kat•anaugb v. Kctz·cmaugb, (N. J.) 35 Atl. (2d) 691.
As was stated above had the court considered the employment of the wife and then determined in its discretion
that the facts still did not warrant a modification of the decree
it may well be that such discretion would not be upset. However, in this case the appellant was not even allowed to go
into that matter as the court held that as a matter of law
such a change in circumstances was not such as could be considered as a basis for a modification. The order for the
paym~nt of $150.00 per month support money for the children
was reached in this case upon the basis of a stipulation. It
was reached not because of the fact that the husband could
afford to pay $150.00 out of his $300.00 earnings in view
of the financial obligations which he had but because it was
obvious that his wife having no other income could not support
herself and the children on a lesser amount. However, when
the wife secured employment a different situation existed.
While it is true that the pressing situation in which the husbarid
found himself has not been altered since the entry of the
original divorce decree the overall financial picture of the
husband, wife and the children has been considerably altered
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to such an extent that some relief to the husband in view of
the finacial burdens which he had to bear was obviously
justified.

CONCLUSION
The appellant urges that this matter should be returned
to the district court with instructions to vacate the contempt
order and with the direction to order a reduction in the amount
of the support money payable by the husband in accordance
with the prayer of the husband's petition.
Respectfully submitted,

PUGSLEY, HAYES & RAMPTON.
Attorneys for Appellant.
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